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ARGUMENT 
Elmore County expresses the view that the personnel manual is a unilateral 
contract, binding on employees but of no legal consequence to the county. 
" Thus, due to the clear contractual disclaimer in the ECPP at issue here, 
there can be no issue of material fact that there was no intent by Elmore 
County to include the policy or its provisions as a part of Nix' s employment 
agreement." 
Stated differently; as a matter of law asserts the county, at-will employment 
ipso facto precludes the existence of any agreements express or implied 
between an employer and employee. What makes that so? Certainly not the 
manual, which states, "The personnel policy of Elmore County establishes the 
right for a full-time regular and part-time employees to a hearing prior to any 
final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay or 
suspension without pay." It outlines the "elements of procedure" for "any such 
hearing". Elmore admits "plaintiff was a full time employee of Elmore County 
at the time of her termination"(Opening Brief page 3); that she was on 
probation as a disciplinary step when terminated (Opening Brief page 4); was 
classified as full time after serving her initial first-hire probationary period 
which never changed until termination. (Opening Brief page 5.) The 
Termination Decision dated June 18, 2012 states that: " The ECPP provides 
that a permanent employee is entitled to "a hearing prior to any final decision 
on discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay or suspension without 
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pay!' Where is the document, ordinance or resolution reconciling these official 
statements of policy and practice with the briefs statement that they are 
"negated"? Where is a shred of evidence that Elmore County had "no intent by 
(Elmore County) to include the policy or its provisions as a part of Nix' s 
employment agreement."? 
Reliance on the manual when convenient and disavowing it when not, gained 
the attention of Hon.Ronald Bush in Sommers v. Elmore County, 903 
F.Supp32d 1087 (2102). The court therein took note of the inconsistency, 
comparing oral arguments to Elmore's briefs: 
"Defendants' counsel argued at the hearing that, regardless of whether 
Sommer is considered a "regular" full-time employee, as an at-will employee 
she has no property right in continued employment and, thus, no basis for a 
due process challenge. Defendants' briefing, and the record of Sommer's 
employment, suggests otherwise. Defendants repeatedly refer to the hearing 
provided to regular employees and even refer to it as a "right" or "guaranteed" 
for those employees. See, e.g., Defs.' Mem., p. 2 (Dkt. 19-1) ("Sommer was a 
probationary at-will employee at the time of her termination, and the 
County's Personnel Policy only extends the opportunity for a pretermination 
appeal to full-time and part-time regular employees.") (internal citations 
omitted; emphasis added); Defs.' Mem., p. 4 ("In the ... Policy, the only 
limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular 
and part-time regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal 
hearing before termination. This hearing is available to regular employees 
'prior to any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change 
in pay, or suspension without pay."') (internal citations omitted; emphases 
added); Id., pp. 4-5 ("Sommer's termination was proper because she was a 
probationary employee, and was not a Full-Time Regular employee, 
otherwise provided a pre-termination hearing.") (emphasis added); Defs.' 
Reply, p. 2 (0kt. 21) ("In Elmore County, full-time regular employees through 
the Personnel Policy are afforded a pre-deprivation hearing upon notice of 
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termination (if the employee requests it). Sommer, while a full-time 
employee, was a probationary, and not a 'regular' employee, and had no such 
hearing right.") (internal citations omitted); Id., p. 5 (the Policy "only 
guarantees hearings to full time regular employees"). Thus, Defendants' 
briefing indicates that there may be some limitation on the at-will 
employment relationship, at least with respect to "regular" employees, who 
have rights to a pre-termination appeal hearing. See Reply, pp. 4-5 (Dkt. 21); 
Defs.' Mem., p. 4 (Dkt. 19-1) ("In the ... Policy, the only limitation on the at-will 
employment relationship is that full-time regular and part-time regular 
employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before 
termination. This hearing is available to regular employees.")." 
The manual's disclaimer serves the purpose of establishing that county 
employees are at will, based upon cases viewing such disclaimers as dispositive 
of the issue. However it does not follow that if employees are at-will, there can 
be no agreements of employment. That is contrary to the language in the 
manual and Elmore's interpretation of it. A pre-termination hearing is granted 
to any "permanent employee". The manual does not state at-will status nullifies 
twenty-one pages detailing the obligations and duties of county employees and 
the county. 
Elmore does not address Cantwell v City of Boise, 191 P.3d 205 (2008) holding 
that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in all employment 
agreements, including at-will relationships. Depriving Nix of her pre-
termination hearing and procedures violated that covenant. Those procedures 
not only existed but also were as the manual states were an "entitlement" to 
permanent employees. Construing the manual to read that Nix was a "new 
employee probationer" is the opposite of good faith. Depriving her of the basic 
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right to address charges against her was not an undue burden on the county nor 
did it imply she was other than an at-will employee who could be discharged for 
any reason. The right to such a hearing is fundamental justice regardless of how 
characterized; the cornerstone of good faith. Fox v. Mountain West Electric, 52 
P.3d 848 (2002), citing Continental Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply 
Co. 95 Idaho 739,518 P.2d 1205 (1995). 
Another statement without basis is: 
"Thus, by simple logic, if Nix was, in fact an at-will employee, there were no 
limitations on either Elmore County's or Nix's right to terminate the 
employment relationship, which would negate any implied opportunity to 
receive a pre-termination hearing." 
The definition of "at will" is the right to terminate without cause. "Without 
cause" if assigned a value of x does not by deduction or induction mandate Y; no 
pre-termination hearing. 
"An employee who is hired for an indeterminate period of time is known as an 
employee at will and it is well established that if he is not hired for some definite 
period of time he has no right of action upon being discharged" . 
. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District 98 Idaho 330, 563 P2d 54. (1997). 
Nothing in that definition implies that all terms and conditions of employment 
are extinguished. Elmore never asserted in day-to-day practice that the terms 
and conditions of the manual did not exist; just the opposite. Conditions of 
probation, decisions and notifications cite to the manual for authority. Implicit in 
such reliance upon the manual is an acknowledgment of the manual as a 
contractual agreement. 
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Admittedly this case is unique in that the pre termination hearing agreement 
customarily is found in employment contracts where discharge is only for cause 
and there is a promise of permanent employment. A reading of the Elmore 
County personnel manual leaves one ·with the impression that it is without 
question meant to be a contract for permanent employment, save the disclaimer 
boldly printed on the first page. This county and many other government 
agencies and counties have similar manuals with identical disclaimers thereby 
salvaging the at will doctrine, at least for the time being. It can be argued that the 
termination hearing language is merely surplusage and not of sufficient 
importance to stand alone as a contract or express agreement. However that is 
inconsistent with the entire section on termination being very exhaustively 
addressed and secondly, treated by the county as a stand-alone agreement 
distinctly separate from the other provisions of the manual. It is stated as black 
letter law by Elmore County that "full time" employees have this vested contract 
right and in fact, the county implies such employees are not at will, tying together 
new probationary employees who have not attained full time permanent status, 
with being "at will" and not entitled to a pre termination hearing; it is repeated 
many times in official letters, notices and decisions. By insisting that this is a 
"right" afforded to a particular class of employee, the permanent one, ensures 
that it has a life of its own; it attains a status of contractual importance, obviously 
not meant to be swept aside with the rubric that " at will employees have no 
enforceable contract rights". It is the county that enthroned the hearing with 
contractual, divisible standing. To now protest that it should not survive a finding 
of at will employment has no support in the language of the manual or its 
practical application by the county. Good faith and fair dealing mandate that 
conclusion. 
ed this /)_day of August 2014. 
e Schlender for Appellant Nix 
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